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ON MATHEMATICAL REALISM AND THE
APPLICABILITY OF HYPERREALS
EMANUELE BOTTAZZI, VLADIMIR KANOVEI, MIKHAIL G. KATZ,
THOMAS MORMANN, AND DAVID SHERRY
Abstract. We argue that Robinson’s hyperreals have just as much
claim to applicability as the garden variety reals.
In a recent text, Easwaran and Towsner (ET) analyze the ap-
plicability of mathematical techniques in the sciences, and intro-
duce a distinction between techniques that are applicable and those
that are merely instrumental. Unfortunately the authors have not
shown that their distinction is a clear and fruitful one, as the exam-
ples they provide are superficial and unconvincing. Moreover, their
analysis is vitiated by a reliance on a naive version of object real-
ism which has long been abandoned by most philosophical realists
in favor of truth-value realism. ET’s argument against the appli-
cability of hyperreals based on automorphisms of hyperreal mod-
els involves massaging the evidence and is similarly unconvincing.
The purpose of the ET text is to argue that Robinson’s infinitesi-
mal analysis is merely instrumental rather than applicable. Yet in
spite of Robinson’s techniques being applied in physics, probabil-
ity, and economics (see e.g., [70, Chapter IX], [1], [76], [60]), ET
don’t bother to provide a meaningful analysis of even a single case
in which these techniques are used. Instead, ET produce page af-
ter page of speculations mainly imitating Connesian chimera-type
arguments ‘from first principles’ against Robinson. In an earlier
paper Easwaran endorsed real applicability of the σ-additivity of
measures, whereas the ET text rejects real applicability of the ax-
iom of choice, voicing a preference for ZF. Since it is consistent
with ZF that the Lebesgue measure is not σ-additive, Easwaran
is thereby walking back his earlier endorsement. We note a re-
lated inaccuracy in the textbook Measure Theory by Paul Halmos.
ET’s arguments are unacceptable to mathematicians because they
ignore a large body of applications of infinitesimals in science, and
massage the evidence of some crucial mathematical details to con-
form with their philosophical conclusions.
Keywords: object realism; truth-value realism; applicability; hy-
perreals; infinitesimals; instrumentalism; rigidity; automorphisms;
Lotka–Volterra model; Lebesgue measure; σ-additivity
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1. Varieties of realism
In a text entitled “Realism in Mathematics: The Case of the Hy-
perreals” [33], K. Easwaran and H. Towsner (henceforth ET) deal with
the following two general questions related to the issue of mathematical
realism:
(1) Which mathematical claims can be taken as meaningful and
true within mathematics?
(2) Which mathematical ideas can be taken as applying to the phys-
ical world as part of scientific theory?
For the special case of hyperreals ∗R in the sense of Robinson’s frame-
work for analysis with infinitesimals and related approaches, these ques-
tions are answered by ET as follows:
(1)* The hyperreals ∗R are meaningful mathematically since their
existence can be ensured within mathematics by the axiom of
choice (AC). ET consider AC to be true.
(2)* In contrast to the reals R, the hyperreals ∗R have no real appli-
cation in science as part of a scientific theory. Hyperreals may
only be used instrumentally, as ‘computational tools,’ but they
do not correspond to anything that exists in the real world.
Real numbers correspond directly to objects existing in the real
world and therefore are to be considered as applicable.
ET consider item (1)* as a claim that supports mathematical realism
since it ensures a certain kind of existence of certain mathematical
entities. Namely, hyperreals exist within the universe of mathematical
entities. Complementarily, ET conceive item (2)* as an anti-realist
claim, since it denies a certain kind of existence to ∗R. More precisely,
hyperreals do not exist in the real world, since the hyperreals are not
part of a (true) scientific theory of the real world. Only real numbers
exist, since they are part of (true) scientific theories of the real world.
According to ET, this ‘mixed’ character of their account of (math-
ematical) realism shows that ET’s brand of realism is more balanced
than other purely ‘realist’ or purely ‘anti-realist’ accounts.
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In this paper we argue that items (1)* and (2)* actually provide ev-
idence for something quite different, namely, that ET subscribe to an
outdated and simplistic account of mathematical realism (and of scien-
tific realism as well) that fails to meet the criteria of current literature
in contemporary philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science.
We will first argue for these claims for mathematical realism. Then we
show that ET not only miss the point for mathematical realism but for
scientific realism as well.
More precisely, ET subscribe to an ontological realism in mathemat-
ics that is exclusively concerned with the question of the existence of
mathematical objects, be it the existence within mathematics or out-
side mathematics. For some time, this ontological question (be it in
mathematics or in science) is no longer the only game in town.
1.1. Dummett, Shapiro, Putnam. With respect to mathematical
realism it is generally admitted that there are at least two different re-
alist themes in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. According to
the first, mathematical objects exist independently of mathematicians,
their minds, languages, and so on. This is the only version of realism
ET deal with. It may be succinctly characterized as an ontological or
object realism. A unique feature of ET’s approach is their quest for
“numbers that correspond to the world,” not found in, and a likely
embarrassment for, any object realist such as Colyvan [23].
The second theme in contemporary mathematical realism centers
around the thesis that mathematical statements have objective truth-
values independent of the minds, languages, conventions, and so forth,
of mathematicians. This realism may be called truth-value realism or
objectivity realism. It can be characterized as a realism that centers
around the objectivity of mathematical discourse. According to it, the
interesting and important questions of philosophy of mathematics are
not over mathematical objects, but over the objectivity of mathematics
(Shapiro [73], 1997, p. 37).
Truth-value realism does not center around an ontological view the-
sis. Although truth-value realism claims that many mathematical state-
ments have unique and objective truth-values, it is not committed to a
distinctively platonist idea that such truth-values are to be explained
in terms of an ontology of mathematical objects. A related challenge
to the uniqueness of ontology of mathematical objects was developed
by Benacerraf [5].
Philosophers of quite different orientations have argued for objectiv-
ity realism in mathematics. Even if they disagree widely on the var-
ious issues related to the existence of mathematical objects, virtually
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all converge in the assertion that mathematics is the objective science
par excellence. Therefore they consider it a central task of philosophy
of mathematics to elucidate what exactly is meant by this assertion.
As Michael Dummett put it succinctly: “What is important is not the
existence of mathematical objects but the objectivity of mathematical
statements” [29, p. 508].
A prominent example of a philosopher of mathematics who argued
vigorously for a truth-value realism in mathematics is Hilary Putnam.
Although Putnam was notorious for changing his philosophical views a
number of times, with respect to the issue of a non-ontological realism
in mathematics his convictions have remained remarkably stable. For
forty years in the course of his entire philosophical career he insisted on
a non-ontological realism. Already in his What is mathematical Truth?
he put forward the thesis that “The question of realism is the question
of the objectivity of mathematics and not the question of the existence
of mathematical objects” (Putnam [67], 1975, p. 70).
In “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics”
(Putnam [68], 2012) he insisted that his well-known indispensability
argument should be understood as an argument for the objectivity of
mathematics, and not as an argument for a platonist interpretation of
mathematics. The point is reiterated in his posthumously published
essay in 2016:
[O]ne does not have to ‘buy’ Platonist epistemology to
be a realist in the philosophy of mathematics. The
modal logical picture shows that one doesn’t have to
‘buy’ Platonist ontology either.” (Putnam 2016 [69],
p. 345)
1.2. Maddy on varieties of realism. Some years ago, Penelope
Maddy in her book Defending the Axioms. On the Philosophical Foun-
dations of Set Theory (Maddy [62], 2011) took up the issue of mathe-
matical realism. In Defending the Axioms we find a detailed and bal-
anced discussion of the two themes of object realism versus objectivity
realism in mathematics as presented by Shapiro, Dummett, Putnam
and others; cf. Maddy (2011, chapter (V.1)).
ET refer to Maddy as well but in a rather unfortunate way. They do
not mention Maddy (2011), but seek to use some of her earlier work to
render plausible their distinction between real application and merely
instrumental use. ET write:
As Penelope Maddy says about physics, ‘its pages are
littered with applications of mathematics that are ex-
pressly understood not to be literally true: e.g., the
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analysis of water waves by assuming the water to be
infinitely deep or the treatment of matter as continuous
in fluid dynamics or the representation of energy as a
continuously varying quantity.’ [Maddy, 1992, p. 281]”
(Maddy as quoted in [33, p. 5])
Yet, as (Maddy 2011) shows, she is no longer interested in arguing
for the existence of mathematical objects analogous to the existence of
“planets and atoms and giraffes, independently of the human mind”
[33, p. 1], as ET put it. Quite generally, the issue of which numbers
‘correspond to the world’ is not one that interests many philosophers
of mathematical realism today.
In her book Maddy is mainly interested in the objectivity of set
theory. Even if the question of set-theoretic axioms and their onto-
logical status were to be settled to the satisfaction of philosophers,
and even if all objects of mathematics could be reconstructed as sets,
there is no reason to assume that thereby all problems of philosophy of
mathematics would be solved. One may ask: “Do groups, Riemannian
manifolds, Hilbert spaces objectively exist?” For instance, did groups
as mathematical objects come into being in the second half of the 19th
century, or did they exist since times immemorial as may be suggested
by the example of finite symmetry groups of geometrical figures (see
e.g., Wussing [78])?
It seems plausible that philosophy of mathematics is more than phi-
losophy of set theory. The objectivity of mathematics should not be
discussed in the overly abstract realm of set theory alone. Problems
of mathematical realism do not only arise for sets, even if, arguably,
every mathematical object could be reconstructed as a structured set.
Indeed, dealing with the question ‘Are there groups?’ or ‘Are there Rie-
mannian manifolds?’ instead of the analogous, rather wornout ques-
tions ‘Are there sets?’ or ‘Are there numbers?’ has some advantages,
and not only didactic ones.
1.3. On the dialectics of tool and object. If science is aWerdefak-
tum (‘Fact in Becoming’ as the neo-Kantians such as Cassirer claimed)
the objectivity of mathematical discourse may have to be conceived
as a ‘fact in becoming’ as well, depending on the historically evolving
practice of mathematical discourse (see [63, Section 2.1]). The mathe-
matical practice may change the nature of mathematical objects: they
may change from mere tools to full-fledged objects. From this perspec-
tive also the history of mathematics (and science) becomes important
for the issue of mathematical realism.
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1.4. Maddy on history of mathematics and science. (Defending
the Axioms, pp. 27–29). One clear moral for mathematics in applica-
tion is that we are not in fact uncovering the underlying mathematical
structures realized in the world. Rather, we are constructing abstract
mathematical models and endeavoring to make true assertions about
the ways in which they do or do not correspond to physical facts.
There are rare cases where such a correspondence is something like
isomorphism, as for elementary arithmetic and simple combinatorics
and there are probably others, like the use of finite group theory to de-
scribe simple symmetries. However, in most cases the correspondence
is something more complex.
For the relation between the physical and the mathematical, an iso-
morphism is the great exception. Moreover, ET ignore the most essen-
tial aspects of mathematical conceptualisation. The correspondence
between the empirical and the mathematical (ideal) is more complex.
Cassirer drew the conclusion that not the existence of objects, but
objectivity of the method is important; see further in Section 1.5.
ET rely on an outdated model of the relation between mathemat-
ics and physics proposed already by Newton and Galileo, namely, that
mathematics can and does discover the mathematical structure of the
world, or better, that the world has a unique mathematical structure.
Such a view is related to the well-known Cantor–Dedekind postulate
according to which the real mathematical line actual describes the phys-
ical line, a position untenable in view of contemporary knowledge in
physics (see Sections 2 and 3.4).
Since the application of mathematical concepts typically amounts to
an idealisation, mathematical concepts have no direct correspondence
in the ‘real world’. This holds even for a seemingly elementary concept
such as the natural numbers N. After all, it is an essential feature
of N that it is an infinite structure, and clearly, even the ‘small’ infinity
of N has no direct correspondence in the ‘real world’; see further in
Section 2.8.
1.5. Cassirer on object and objectivity. Maddy and most other
contemporary philosophers of mathematics, having been educated in
the Anglo-Saxon tradition of analytic philosophy, tend to attribute
the merit of having shifted the attention of philosophers of mathe-
matics from questions of object realism to questions dealing with the
objectivity of mathematics to a rather obscure and unelaborated re-
mark of Georg Kreisel’s; see e.g., [62, p. 115, note 4]. However influen-
tial Kreisel’s remark may have been in recent analytical philosophy of
mathematics, Kreisel was by no means the first to note the relevance
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of distinguishing between a realism concerning mathematical objects
and a realism concerning the objectivity of mathematical discourse.
Already in the first decade of the 20th century, the neo-Kantian
philosopher Ernst Cassirer had elaborated in his Substance and Func-
tion ([20], 1910) a neo-Kantian philosophy of science and mathematics
that emphasized (for both mathematics and natural science) the impor-
tance of distinguishing between two interpretations of realism, namely,
object realism and truth-value (objectivity) realism.
It is not very surprising that Cassirer’s philosophy of mathematics
has been virtually ignored in the quarters of analytic philosophy. For
a long time Cassirer has been classified as a partisan of some stripe
of continental idealism, giving analytic philosophers an excuse not to
take his work seriously.
The underlying reason for such a lamentable state of affairs may have
been that in traditional 20th century Anglo-Saxon philosophy there
is a conviction that idealist philosophy on the one hand and serious
science and philosophy of science on the other do not go well together.
Often, idealism plays the role of a strawman to whom all the vices are
attributed that one wishes to criticize. In the 21st century one still
finds philosophers such as Susan Haack who propagate virtually the
same caricature of idealism that Scheffler put forward almost 50 years
ago:
An idealist holds that everything there is, is mental:
that the world is a construction out of our, or, in the
case of the solipsist, his own, ideas – subjective idealism;
. . . or that the world is itself of a mental or spiritual
character – objective idealism, as in Hegel. (Haack [44],
2002, p. 70)
Evidently, for Haack idealism is not an option to be taken seriously.
For her, idealism is the bogey of realists. For some time, however, such
an attitude has turned out to be increasingly untenable due to the
fact that Cassirer’s neo-Kantian philosophy of science is re-evaluated
as a serious competitor to the classical analytical philosophy of science,
namely, the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and related groups
such as Reichenbach’s Berlin group; see e.g., [22], [41], [42].
The starting point of Cassirer’s account of critical idealism is the
insight that the ‘object’ of scientific knowledge - be it mathematical
or empirical knowledge - should not be conceived as a kind of Kantian
‘thing-in-itself’ beyond all possible experience. Rather,
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If we determine the object not as an absolute substance
beyond all knowledge, but as the object shaped in pro-
gressing experience, we find that there is no ‘epistemo-
logical gap’ to be laboriously spanned by some author-
itative decree of thought, by a ‘transsubjective com-
mand.’ For this object may be called ‘transcendent’
from the standpoint of a psychological individual; from
the standpoint of logic and its supreme principles, nev-
ertheless it is to be characterized as purely immanent. It
remains strictly within the sphere, which these princi-
ples determine and limit, especially the universal prin-
ciples of mathematical and scientific knowledge. This
simple thought alone constitutes the kernel of critical
‘idealism’.” (Substance and Function [20], 1910, p. 297)
For Cassirer, knowledge never starts with well-determined objects that
are ‘given’ to a cognizing subject. Rather, objects are the result of an
objectifying process:
To know a content means to make it an object by rais-
ing it out of the mere status of givenness and granting
it a certain logical constancy and necessity. Thus we do
not know ‘objects’ as if they were already independently
determined and given as objects, - but we know objec-
tively, by producing certain limitations and by fixating
certain permanent elements and connections within the
uniform flow of experience. The concept of the object
in this sense constitutes no ultimate limit of knowledge,
but is rather the fundamental instrument, by which all
that has become its permanent possession is expressed
and established. The object marks the logical possession
of knowledge, and not a dark beyond forever removed
from knowledge.” (Substance and Function, p. 303)
Perhaps one may say that for Cassirer an ‘object’ is generated by a
scientific method of objectification. Thus (valid) scientific concepts do
not aim to produce ‘copies’ of pre-existing objects; rather,
Scientific . . . concepts are valid, not in that they copy a
fixed, given being, but in so far as they contain a plan
for possible constructions of unity, which must be pro-
gressively verified in practice, in application to the em-
pirical material. But the instrument, that leads to the
unity and thus to the truth of thought, must be in itself
fixed and secure. . . . We need, not the objectivity of
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absolute things, but rather the objective determinateness
of the method of experience.” (Substance and Function,
p. 322; emphasis added)
This summary of Cassirer’s position may suffice to provide evidence
that his ‘critical idealism’ has little in common with the simplistic car-
icature of idealism as found in Haack’s description of this philosophical
current in [44, p. 70]. Moreover, Cassirer offers us a more elaborate
account of the interplay of objects and objectivity in the practice of
science than Kreisel’s succinct remark that bluntly asserts that for
mathematics its objectivity is more important than the existence of its
objects. Cassirer’s critical idealism treats mathematical and scientific
realism on a par: for both areas he argues for a truth-value realism
as opposed to an ontological object-centered realism. This should be
considered as a virtue since it enables us to overcome the boundaries
between mathematics and the natural sciences that in the age of an
ever more mathematicized science are becoming ever more artificial
and obsolete.
2. Applicable vs instrumental
As we already mentioned in Section 1, ET pursue a distinction be-
tween mathematical ideas meaningful within mathematics and those
meaningful within the sciences. Section 1 dealt with philosophical
shortcomings of their approach. In this section we will focus on the
mathematical shortcomings of their analysis. ET focus on
the question of which mathematical claims can be taken
as meaningful and true within mathematics, and which
mathematical ideas can be taken as applying to the phys-
ical world as part of a scientific theory.” [33, p. 1] (em-
phasis added)
They also pursue a related distinction between mathematical tech-
niques that can be described as applicable (such as Newtonian me-
chanics or quantum mechanics) and ones that are merely instrumen-
tally useful in modeling. ET take the superior applicable techniques to
“accurately describe” (see Section 2.4) or “correctly model” the world.
They seek to apply such an applicable vs instrumental dichotomy to
an appraisal of Robinson’s framework [70] for analysis with infinitesi-
mals. The main thrust of their text is the claim that real numbers are
applicable whereas hyperreal numbers are merely instrumental. We
argue that the ET argument fails at several levels, as follows.
(1) (Realism a` l’ancienne) ET claim that they adopt the philosoph-
ical position of scientific realism and pursue the issue of which
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numbers “correspond to the world”(see e.g., Section 2.11). How-
ever, the issue as stated is not a relevant issue in contemporary
trends in realism in the philosophy of mathematics, as analyzed
in Section 1.1. The current literature addresses not the issue of
which mathematical objects correspond to the world, but rather
the issue of the objectivity of mathematical discourse; see Sec-
tion 3.1.
(2) (Representing the world and Cantor–Dedekind) ET seek to drive
a wedge between the applicability of the reals and that of hyper-
reals on account, in their words, of providing “representation of
part of the world” ([33, p. 9]), but their stance is conditioned
on the adoption of the Cantor–Dedekind postulate. The latter
involves an identification of a Cantor–Dedekind real line as they
understood it with a physical line. Such a stance is untenable
in view of contemporary knowledge in physics; see Sections 2.10
and 3.4.
(3) (Elegance u¨ber alles) Well into their argument, ET pull out of
a hat a criterion of the elegance of a mathematical framework
(a fine criterion, to be sure; see Section 4.1). They use it to
justify a reliance on a standard uncountable number system
of cardinality c. But ET fail to apply their elegance criterion
consistently when it comes to adopting a standard structure
of cardinality c over the traditional reals; see Section 4.6. ET
thus display a double standard indicating a partiality of their
analysis.
(4) (Physics to the rescue) ET claim that “an applicable use of
the hyperreals would require substantial new developments in
physics.” However, such a claim ignores the existence of numer-
ous such applications as developed e.g., in Albeverio et al. [1];
see Section 5.1 for additional sources.
(5) (Applicability of AC-dependent entities) ET claim that their
objections to using hyperreals in mathematical models in physics
apply also to other entities whose existence cannot be proved in
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZF) without the use of the Axiom
of Choice (AC). However, they focus their critique on Robin-
son’s framework, and ignore the existence of many applications
relying on other entities commonly used in traditional math-
ematics, whose existence cannot be proved without exploiting
AC-related principles.
(6) (Walking back earlier endorsement) ET’s position is at odds
with an earlier endorsement of σ-additivity by Easwaran. For
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a discussion on the applicability of the Lebesgue measure with-
out AC and on other consequences of accepting at face value
ET’s claim that their objections to the hyperreals apply also
to mathematical entities independent of ZF, see Sections 5.5
through 5.10.
(7) (Undercutting and rebutting) We will exploit a dichotomy of re-
butting vs undercutting developed by Easwaran in [32]. Briefly,
rebutting an argument involves showing that its conclusions con-
tradict those reached in other work published in reliable venues,
whereas undercutting involves finding gaps in the argument it-
self. We will use the dichotomy to analyze the ET text [33].
2.1. Chimera and dart strategies. To elaborate further on the last
item (7), note that a related dichotomy contrasts two possible strategies
for challenging the applicability of a particular fragment of mathemat-
ics:
(Co1) (the “chimera” strategy) Argue from first mathematical prin-
ciples that there are built-in shortcomings in the fragment of
mathematics that would disqualify it from applications;
(Co2) (the “dart” strategy) Analyze a particular attempt to apply the
fragment of mathematics to a specific area of science and show
concretely how it falls short of the mark.
An example of the chimera strategy (Co1) is Connes’ attempt in
[25, p. 14] to exploit the Solovay model so as to argue that hyperreals
are chimeras. His attempt is evaluated in [50, pp. 263, 278, 279 and
Section 8.2, p. 287].
Another example of strategy (Co1) involves the basic form of Smooth
Infinitesimal Analysis (SIA). The basic form has only nilsquare in-
finitesimals, which may hinder applications of the basic form of SIA in
more advanced applications in physics and geometry where second-
order Taylor expansion and second differentials appear, such as New-
tonian mechanics or curvature of curves in differential geometry. Note
that there are more advanced versions of SIA possessing nilpotent in-
finitesimals of higher order than 2 (see [57]); our purpose here is merely
to give an example illustrating the chimera strategy (Co1).
An example of the dart strategy (Co2) is Connes’ attempt in [25,
p. 13] to find fault with hyperreals in a specific application involving
throwing darts at a target; his attempt is evaluated in [50, Section 8.1,
pp. 286–287].
Between 1994 and 2007, Connes used to offer apriori chimera-type ar-
guments ‘from first principles’ against hyperreals. In 2013, two articles
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appeared analyzing Connesian chimera critiques: Kanovei et al. [50]
and Katz–Leichtnam [53].
Connes has toned down his approach since then. His most recent
piece touching on the nature of infinitesimals no longer seeks to contrast
the respective infinitesimals of Connes and Robinson but rather those
of Newton and Leibniz. Connes claims that to Newton, an infinitesimal
was a variable taking determined values and tending to zero, whereas
to Leibniz, it was a number (we will refrain from commenting on the
historical merits of such a claim). Thus, Connes writes that his own
new set-up immediately provides a natural home for the
‘infinitesimal variables’: and here the distinction be-
tween ‘variables’ and numbers (in many ways this is
where the point of view of Newton is more efficient
than that of Leibniz) is essential. It is worth quoting
Newton’s definition of variables and of infinitesimals, as
opposed to Leibniz: [‘]In a certain problem, a variable
is the quantity that takes an infinite number of values
which are quite determined by this problem and are ar-
ranged in a definite order[’] (Connes [26], 2018, p. 168)
In sum, the difference between Newton/Connes and Leibniz/Robinson
now boils down to the fact that Connes leaves a null sequence alone (or
more precisely replaces it by a compact operator with the corresponding
spectrum), whereas Robinson carries out a quotient space construction
involving a nontrivial equivalence relation, resulting in infinitesimals
that are numbers and not merely sequences.
Unlike Connes, Easwaran continues his attempts to market Con-
nesian chimera arguments from first principles, aimed against Robin-
son. Since Robinson’s infinitesimal analysis requires AC or some
weaker form of it in order to develop the hyperreals, Easwaran seeks to
undermine the legitimacy of Robinson’s framework by attacking that
of AC (see further in Section 5.4).
This, however, constitutes philosophical opportunism because in an
earlier paper, Easwaran sought on the contrary to defend the real ap-
plicability of countable additivity, which depends on AC just as a hy-
perreal field does; see Section 5.5.
2.2. ET vs Lotka–Volterra. ET provide an example of a strategy of
type (Co2) in the context of the Lotka–Volterra theory (LV), a model
of predator-prey population dynamics. They claim that LV is only in-
strumental rather than applicable, on the grounds that the real number
resulting from a solution of the LV differential equations is in general
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noninteger, and a noninteger obviously cannot literally represent the
size of a mammal population.
This is an example of an ET attempt to exhibit a shortcoming of the
fragment of mathematics represented by LV. We argue that it is not a
successful example in any meaningful sense, since the trivial modifica-
tion ⌊LV⌋ defeats the non-representability objection; see Section 2.5.
In fact ET focus almost exclusively on strategy (Co1) when it comes
to challenging Robinson’s framework. Namely, ET seek to argue inap-
plicability from first mathematical principles (rather than examining
specific applications). In this sense, they are committing the same fal-
lacy as Connes before them, who sought to base a refutation on Solovay
models, undefinability, etc.
We argue that strategy (Co1) is rarely a legitimate way of refuting
the applicability of a mathematical theory (unless one is dealing with
pseudoscience like Sergeyev’s and Rizza’s; see [43], [51], [56], [74]). If
so, the ET effort fails on two counts: (a) it misses the mark on what it
takes to challenge a fragment of mathematics in a meaningful fashion;
(b) the critique is grounded in an obsolete version of the philosophy of
object realism.
2.3. Axiom of choice. In connection with the status of the axiom of
choice (AC), ET write:
[W]hether or not all well-formed mathematical state-
ments have a definite fact, there is a fact about the
Axiom of Choice, and the fact is that it is true, as well
as all of its consequences. [33, p. 2] (emphasis added)
It may be helpful to clarify the context of this remark. There is a
spectrum of opinions among mathematicians as to the exact status of
AC. One of possible positions is to postulate AC as being true, as ET
have done.
Easwaran argued in [31] against the use of hyperreal fields on the
grounds of their alleged reliance on AC:
My claim is . . . that no physical facts could make one
of these infinitesimals rather than another be the cre-
dences of a particular agent. Although the Axiom of
Choice guarantees that such hyperreal-valued functions
exist, and although these functions are quite useful to
talk about in mathematical contexts, they have math-
ematical structure that goes beyond that of credences.
None of this rules out a certain instrumental use of hy-
perreals. [31, p. 33] (emphasis added)
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We note that declaring AC to be true may be a good instrumental
attitude while doing professional mathematics, but relying on such an
assumption while doing professional philosophy tends to undercut the
authors’ credibility, because it confuses syntax and semantics.
While ET adopt the position of mathematical realism, theirs is pre-
sumably intended to be a sophisticated kind of realism publishable in
respectable philosophical venues like Philosophical Review where [31]
was published. A philosophically sound position (whether realist or
not) would have to account for the difference between theory and
model. Meanwhile, AC is part of the former and therefore can’t be
declared true in any but an instrumental sense. Philosophical realists
like Putnam and Maddy don’t subscribe to naive notions of the kind in-
volved in declaring this or that axiom to be true, but rather argue for
the objectivity of mathematical discourse; see Sections 1.2 and 3.1.
Furthermore, what ET write here about AC is at odds with what
Easwaran wrote elsewhere about the real applicability of σ-additivity;
see Section 5.5.
2.4. Accurately describing the world. ET write:
The question is about the extent to which the theories
we build using various purported mathematical entities
accurately describe the world, or are merely instrumen-
tally useful in modeling the world and making observa-
tional predictions. [33, p. 2] (emphasis added)
This passage is found in their Section 1.2 entitled Applicability. The
unique reference ET provide in this section is Chakravartty [21].
However, Chakravartty’s Stanford entry is about scientific realism.
For him, scientific realism means realism concerning the empirical sci-
ences, i.e., physics, chemistry, biology etc. He explicitly asserts: “Sci-
entific realism is a realism about whatever is described by our best
scientific theories.” In passing, he mentions other kinds of realisms,
for instance ‘external world realism,’ ‘sense datum realism,’ ‘mathe-
matical realism.’ None of these varieties of realisms are treated by
Chakravartty. Thus, none of the terms used by Chakravartty in the
Stanford article are directly applicable to the realism ET are inter-
ested in, namely, mathematical realism. Thus, the ET reference to
Chakravartty’s article is gratuitous.
Furthermore, the ET quest for aspects of mathematical models that
would “accurately describe the world” is arguably a quixotic one (see
Section 1.4). We will interpret the ET position charitably as a search
for a dichotomy between applicable (rather than accurate) fragments
and merely instrumental fragments. However, ET don’t provide any
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convincing examples to motivate their dichotomy. Their example of
mammal-counting (see Section 2.5) fails to deliver on its promise. The
absence of well-motivated examples undercuts the seriousness of their
thesis.
2.5. ⌊Lotka–Volterra⌋. In connection with the study of predator-
prey population dynamics, ET write:
As a simple example, the structure of the natural num-
bers seems to accurately represent counts of predators
and prey (at least, when talking about mammals or birds
or other macroscopic animals with clear individuation).
But while the real-valued differential equations of the
Lotka–Volterra model can often be useful in predict-
ing or understanding the ways the predator and prey
populations will change, the infinite precision of various
non-integer values that show up are not taken to rep-
resent the actual numbers of predators or prey in the
ecosystem. [33, p. 2]
Here ET seek to establish a contrast between mammal-counting and
Lotka–Volterra modeling of a mammal population in an ecosystem.
However, their pastoral example is unconvincing because one can sim-
ply modify the outcome of the Lotka–Volterra (LV) solution by ap-
plying the integer part (floor) function. With respect to the resulting
model, that we will denote ⌊LV⌋, one achieves both of the following
objectives:
(1) The modified model ⌊LV⌋ yields an integer for an answer; and
(2) the mathematical essence of the LV model is unchanged in pass-
ing from LV to ⌊LV⌋.
The modification we introduced in no way affects the issue of the alleged
inadequacy of the Lotka–Volterra model in describing “actual numbers
of predators or prey in the ecosystem” as ET put it. This undercuts
their argument since it highlights ET’s failure to exhibit any meaningful
shortcoming on the part of the Lotka–Volterra model that would make
it instrumental rather than applicable. ET return to the LV theme
later in the article:
[B]iologists often represent populations of predator-prey
systems with the Lotka–Volterra differential equations,
using real numbers (rather than integers) to count pop-
ulations. [33, p. 5]
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This recurring example is not helpful if their goal is to convince the
reader that they propose a meaningful dichotomy, because the mod-
ified ⌊LV⌋ solution does have integer values, defeating their pastoral
distinction.
2.6. Vague predicates. While it is true that the number of mammals
in a given ecosystem or habitat will be a natural number, the number
assigned can not be warranted as an accurate description. Indeed, a
predicate like “in a given habitat” is not an exact predicate, since it
admits borderline cases.
The observer doing the counting has to make conventional decisions
about which individuals to count as satisfying the predicate. His de-
cisions constitute the first step of idealisation. Animals move in and
out of habitats just as people move in and out of a crowd. When one
starts counting species, as ecologists do, things get more complicated.
Thus, idealisation is involved regardless of whether N or R is used as a
basic number system.
The question of accurate modeling of population dynamics is ad-
dressed in a more subtle manner than what is found in [33] in both
undergraduate textbooks [61] and research articles [18].
2.7. Are infinitesimals added to R or found inside R? In connec-
tion with number systems used in scientific modeling, ET write: “The
hyperreals are an extension of the real numbers to include infinitesimal
numbers, etc.” [33, p. 2].
Such a viewpoint is a common one and accurately describes many ap-
plications of infinitesimals. Significantly, ET’s philosophical objections
are contingent upon such an extension view. However, there is another
approach that does not view the theory incorporating very small num-
bers as such an extension, namely Edward Nelson’s approach [64] as
summarized in Section 2.8.
2.8. Nelson’s view. In Nelson’s framework, one works within the or-
dinary real line and finds numbers that behave like infinitesimals there
via a foundational adjustment. Such an adjustment involves an enrich-
ment of the language of set theory through the introduction of a one-
place predicate st called “standard,” together with additional axioms
governing its interaction with the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set the-
ory (ZFC); see Fletcher et al. [38], Katz–Kutateladze [52], Lawler [58]
for details.
The predicate st can be viewed as a formalisation of Leibniz’s dis-
tinction between assignable and inassignable numbers; see [55], [3].
Arguably, Nelson’s formalisation of mathematical analysis as practiced
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from Leibniz until Cauchy is more faithful than the formalisation devel-
oped by Weierstrass and his followers, who had to discard infinitesimals
since they were unable to account for them in a satisfactory fashion.
In Nelson’s framework Internal Set Theory (IST), an infinitesimal ǫ
is a real number such that |ǫ| is smaller than every standard positive
real number. Similarly, a nonstandard natural number n ∈ N is greater
than every standard natural number.
The possibility of viewing infinitesimals as being found within R itself
pulls the rug from under ET’s philosophical criticisms anchored in the
extension view. Indeed, whatever argument ‘from first principles’ ET
can put forth against hyperreal fields, it must apply against the real
field, as well, because Nelson’s approach takes place within the real
field itself, and is therefore immune to ET’s objections.
For instance, since the only order-preserving automorphism of R is
the identity, nontrivial automorphisms of ∗R in the extension approach
are not internal, and therefore don’t exist in Nelson’s approach, dis-
solving ET’s objection based on automorphisms.
In sum, what ET present as arguments from first principles turn out
to depend on technical choices in set-theoretic foundations, namely
whether to work with a language limited to {∈} or the richer lan-
guage {∈, st} of Nelson’s IST, a conservative extension of ZFC.
2.9. Cardinality fallacy. ET write in a parenthetical remark:
We assume, however, that the language is countable,
since we are concerned with theories which will ulti-
mately be used to describe physical situations. [33, p. 3]
It becomes clear in [33, Section 3.4, p. 9] that when ET mention count-
able languages, they refer to countably infinite languages, as opposed
to uncountably infinite ones; see Section 4.6 below for details.
There is a curious assumption here involving an implied connection
between the countable cardinality on the one hand and what ET re-
fer to as “physical situations” on the other. The bland assumption
that infinity (even countable) can have literal meaning with respect to
“physical situations” seems unwarranted. Have ET enumerated count-
ably many physical entities? The assumption ties in with the unique
aspect of ET object realism discussed in Section 1.1.
2.10. Actual real number. ET’s view concerning the comparative
reality if the reals as compared to the hyperreals is as follows:
[T]he hyperreals extend the reals with infinite numbers:
there is a real ω such that r < ω for every actual real
number r. [33, p. 3]
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Note that in this passage, ET refer to ω as a “real number”. Such an
approach is consistent with Nelson’s viewpoint (see Section 2.8), one
that ET apparently don’t wish to adopt, undercutting their argument.
Furthermore, what exactly is an “actual real number r”? The passage
seem to suggest that ET subscribe to the Cantor–Dedekind postulate,
involving an identification of a Cantor–Dedekind real line (as Cantor
and Dedekind understood it) with a physical line; see [38] for a discus-
sion. Such a stance is untenable in light of contemporary knowledge in
physics; see Section 3.4. Furthermore, ET
think there are some features that mathematical models
of physical phenomena need to have to be taken in a
realist way, and there are principled reasons to think
that hyperreal models will usually lack these features.
[33, pp. 5–6]
However, whatever aspect of idealisation ET identify in hyperreal fields,
will also be present in the real field (see Section 2.8). Therefore, while
their “principled reasons” may be valid, they fail to come to their aid
in driving a wedge between applicability of reals and applicability of
hyperreals.
2.11. Reals are ideal like hyperreals. In a similar vein, ET write:
We don’t deny that hyperreals could figure in models of
this sort - we merely assert that when they are so used,
we should recognize them as idealizations that don’t cor-
respond to the world in the way that other parts of the
models do. [33, p. 5] (emphasis added)
The ET comment about the idealisation aspect of hyperreal fields is
true enough, but it is equally true about the real field, unless one adopts
the Cantor–Dedekind postulate (see Section 2.10). This observation
undercuts the ET argument.
3. Mathematical realism, automorphisms
The authors’ stated pursuit of the philosophy of mathematical real-
ism fails to meet the criteria of current literature in the field.
3.1. Maddy to the rescue. In a passage quoted in Section 1.2, ET
rely on Maddy’s 1992 text concerning idealisation in mathematical
physics. However, Maddy’s position has evolved significantly since
1992. Particularly, in 2011 Maddy published Defending the axioms
that analyzes important distinctions for the discussion of realism in
mathematics, such as objectivity of mathematical discourse versus re-
alism concerning mathematical objects ; see [62, pp. 115–116]. The issue
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of which numbers “correspond to the world” (see Section 2.11) is not
one that interests many philosophers of mathematical realism today.
3.2. The realist/antirealist Potemkin village. ET write:
An anti-realist who claims that all scientific theories are
merely models of this sort, with no clear distinction be-
tween the representational and the fictional parts of the
theories, may deny the cogency of the distinction we are
interested in. But if one accepts a distinction between
the realism of counting mammals with integers and the
instrumentalism of counting mammals with real num-
bers, then one accepts a distinction of the form we would
like to use. [33, p. 5] (emphasis added)
Here ET are attempting to hide behind a figleaf of a traditional realist
vs antirealist dichotomy in an attempt to score a point, but the figleaf
is transparent. One needn’t be an antirealist to doubt that ET have
formulated a “cogent” distinction (as they put it) between applicability
and instrumentalism, as we argued in Section 2.5. There may well exist
a cogent distinction “between the representational and fictional parts
of [scientific] theories” but ET have not given us any cogent reason
to “accept . . . a distinction between the realism of counting mammals
with integers and the instrumentalism of counting mammals with real
numbers.”
3.3. Automorphisms. ET first raise the issue of nontrivial automor-
phisms of ∗R in [33, p. 6]. They seek to capitalize on the existence of
models of hyperreals with nontrivial automorphisms, in contrast with
the reals that are rigid, i.e., lack such automorphisms (see Section 2.8
for the dissolution of their objection in Nelson’s framework). The argu-
ment is that because of the existence of such automorphisms, no specific
infinitesimal can be taken to have “physical meaning” any better than
its image under an automorphism.
The main fallacy of their argument is that any model using an infinite
number, say H , will necessarily involve a certain degree of arbitrari-
ness, since substituting 2H for H would typically do just as well in
such a model.1 No automorphisms are needed to argue this type of
1To give an elementary example, in calculus the integral of a Riemann-integrable
function f on a compact interval [a, b] can be computed as follows. One chooses an
infinite hypernatural number H , partitions [a, b] into H subintervals of length ∆x =
b−a
H
, computes the corresponding infinite Riemann sum, and applies the shadow
(standard part):
∫ b
a
f(x)dx = sh
(∑
H
i=1
f(ξi)∆x
)
. Replacing H by 2H throughout
would not affect the value of the integral.
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indeterminacy. Their focus on the issue of nontrivial automorphisms
misses this basic point.
Furthermore, if as they declared earlier (see Section 2.9), ET wish to
work with countable theories, then the quotient field of Skolem’s non-
Archimedean integers (see e.g., [50, Section 3.2]) provides a rigid non-
Archimedean field as can be proved using Ehrenfeucht’s lemma [35].2
The ET “automorphisms” argument is thus based on massaging the
evidence.
As Skolem’s integers can be naturally embedded in a hyperreal field
(see [4, Section 2.4]), the latter can be viewed as the kind of elegant
“completion” of the former that ET allow for the real completion of
countable fields of computable reals (see Section 4.2), undercutting the
ET argument.
3.4. Physical segments. ET write:
For the example of the numerical representation of dis-
tance, the physical relation is ‘longer than’ and the op-
eration is the ‘concatenation’ of two segments . . . Given
that ‘longer than’ and ‘concatenation’ can be applied
to any pair of distances, that every distance can be ex-
tended and divided, etc. [33, p. 6]
Here ET are postulating both indefinite extension and indefinite divisi-
bility of physical segments, in line with the Cantor–Dedekind postulate
(see Section 2.10) but contrary to established physical theory. ET as-
sume that they can find “physical” segments that can be indefinitely
divided. Such an assumption is dubious and goes contrary to basic prin-
ciples of quantum mechanics, where infinite divisibility breaks down at
quantum levels. Continuum understood as matter is grainy by quan-
tum mechanics, in the sense of violating indefinite divisibility at scales
below Planck.
What about continuum understood as space-time? Einstein field
equation
Rµν −
1
2
Rgµν + Λgµν =
8πG
c4
Tµν
shows via the stress-energy tensor Tµν , that the graininess of matter
necessarily affects the nature of the metric and curvature terms in the
left-hand side. Thus according to general relativity, the metric and the
curvature can have physical meaning only at scales where matter itself
2More precisely, the model S given by Skolem’s non-Archimedean integers is
rigid by Ehrenfeucht’s lemma. Rigidity of this structure is preserved when passing
to the quotient field Q(S) due to a theorem of Julia Robinson [71] that ensures
that S is definable in Q(S) by a first-order formula.
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has meaning. This indicates that the indefinite divisibility of models of
space-time used in relativity theory is necessarily a mere idealisation
as far as very small scales are concerned.
3.5. Archimedean circularity. Concerning the issue of physical rep-
resentation of real numbers, ET write:
Given that ‘longer than’ and ‘concatenation’ can be ap-
plied to any pair of distances, that every distance can be
extended and divided, that ‘concatenation’ and ‘longer
than’ commute appropriately, and theArchimedean prin-
ciple, one can show that a numerical representation of
the conventional sort chosen must in fact exist, etc. [33,
p. 6] (emphasis added)
Here ET seem to postulate that there is an Archimedean principle
for the physical relation “longer than” but ET don’t give a source
for such. Without a source, what the ET are doing is to assume the
conclusion they want to reach, namely that a “representing” number
system is necessarily Archimedean because the target is assumed to be
Archimedean, revealing a logical fallacy known as vicious circle. This
observation undercuts the ET argument.
ET’s fallacy is not uncommon. In a recent article, Walter Dean
discusses
a tradition within measurement theory which questions
whether it is always appropriate to assume that the
mathematical structures employed as scales for length
measurement must be Archimedean. [28, p. 336]
In footnote 75, he provides sources in the literature on measurement
theory that have expressed “similar concerns about the empirical status
of the Archimedean axiom.”
3.6. Changing the subject. ET write:
These examples [of how geometry motivates the intro-
duction of square roots into the number system] so far
only motivate the use of quadratic extensions of the ra-
tionals, but adequate theorizing about physical laws mo-
tivates the use of more complete subfields of the real
numbers. [33, p. 8] (emphasis added)
In this sentence ET have attempted to change the subject of the discus-
sion. Until now ET have spoken about physical reality and what con-
stitutes “accurate” (or applicable; see Section 2) representation thereof.
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Now they have switched to discussing what constitutes “adequate theo-
rizing.” However, their discussion of “adequate theorizing” involves an
equivocation on the meaning of adequate, since adequate theorizing is
not the same as accurate representation. Their changed focus becomes
transparent by the end of the same paragraph; see Section 4.1.
4. Elegant scientific theorizing
4.1. Adequacy and elegance. ET write:
[A] physical system that used only algebraic numbers
could not be phrased in such an elegant way as the dif-
ferential equations traditional for Newtonian and later
theories. [33, p 8] (emphasis added)
Here ET change the focus of what their qualifier adequate refers to. The
adjective no longer refers to (i) existence of an accurate fit with physical
reality, but rather (ii) the elegance of the scientific theory involved (in
this case, the appropriate ordinary differential equations). Falling back
on the criterion of elegance undermines their own argument, as we
argue in Section 4.5.
4.2. Real world quantities, anyone? ET write:
It may be that the full set of real numbers is unneces-
sary - perhaps the computable real numbers . . . suffice.
However using a superstructure causes no harm to the
applicability of the theory so long as the values we at-
tempt to assign to observable quantities belong to the
substructure. [33, p. 8]
The logic of their argument forces ET to admit that the real num-
bers are merely a convenient idealisation; it fact they acknowledge it
repeatedly (see Section 4.3). However, the same is true of the hyperre-
als, underscoring the fact that their argument is on shaky ground. ET
write:
[E]ven if some field between, say, the algebraic numbers
and the computable reals is the correct model of length,
we can work in the full model of the reals even though,
when assigning values to actual real world quantities,
we only ever use values from the subfield. [33, p. 8]
(emphasis added)
In this passage, ET admit that some numbers in the model may not
have an “adequate” referent in their original sense of “adequate” (see
Section 3.6). In other words, some real numbers may not be what they
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refer to in this remarkable sentence as “real world quantities,” in a
unique form of object realism (see Section 1.1).
4.3. Hypercomputation beyond “actual quantities”. ET write:
[E]ven if the computable real numbers (or some other
substructure of the reals) appear to suffice for all current
physics, the discovery of some means of hypercomputa-
tion could change the correct choice of substructure. [33,
p. 8]
All systems ET mentioned so far as potentially corresponding to “real
world quantities”, such as algebraic and computable numbers, are count-
able. Where do the reals come in then? ET write:
[W]hen an applicable model is a substructure of a rigid
larger mode[l], that larger model can remain applicable:
at worst it includes theoretical states that can never
appear in reality, and which are therefore never assigned
to actual quantities. [33, p. 8] (emphasis added)
If some real numbers are never assigned the “actual quantities” as ET
acknowledge, then it clearly follows that R is a convenient idealisation.
Their comment on rigid models seems to endorse the real field and
imply a criticism of hyperreal fields. However, hyperreal fields without
automorphisms can also be constructed, making the system rigid. This
is true both with regard to the usual hyperreal fields relative to suitable
structures of cardinality c (see Section 4.6), and with regard to count-
able models with respect to countable structures (see Section 3.3). ET
have again failed to drive a wedge between the applicability of the reals
and the hyperreals in a meaningful way.
4.4. More “actual representation”. ET write:
To justify the claim that the hyperreals are an actual
representation of some part of the world (rather than
merely a useful computational tool), the representation
must be unique, or at most involve a small number of
arbitrary choices. [33, p. 9]
In the context of the attempt by ET to drive a wedge between reals
and hyperreals, this comment appears to assume that the reals are
an “actual representation of the world” or that at any rate a suitable
subfield of R provides such a representation. This amounts to accepting
the Cantor–Dedekind postulate; see Section 2.10. In line with our
policy of interpreting the ET thesis charitably (see Section 2.4), we
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note that, even if one assumes that what they seek is an applicable
theory, hyperreal fields are adequate to the task; see Section 4.3.
4.5. Countable languages. ET write:
[I]f the continuum hypothesis holds, the hyperreals (viewed
as an ordered field) have many automorphisms which fix
the reals. This continues to hold in any countably infi-
nite expansion of the language of ordered fields – for
instance, we might want to add many functions aris-
ing as solutions to various differential equations, like
exponential and trigonometric functions, in addition to
countably many units and coordinates. [33, p. 9]
Earlier in their text, ET do admit an uncountable number system for
reasons of elegance, so as to be able to defend the use of R as the
basic number system. But their insistence on trimming the language
to countable size does not deliver the desired disqualification of non-
Archimedean systems, since such countable systems can be constructed
that admit no automorphisms, i.e., are rigid; see Section 3.3.
If one insists on keeping all of the uncountably many real numbers,
for similar reasons of elegance, symbols for all functions f : N → N
should be included in the structure. In such case suitable hyperreal
fields do become rigid; see Section 4.6.
A standard tool in quantum mechanics is the Hilbert space ℓ2 of
square-summable sequences. This space has the same cardinality asNN,
namely c. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics is generally thought of as
an applicable theory, undermining the ET thesis.
4.6. Uncountable languages and ridigity. ET finally admit the
following:
In a uncountable language, the situation is more com-
plicated – indeed, in a large enough language, the hy-
perreals can become rigid [Enayat, 2006] – but such an
infeasible language is, to say the least, an unusual set-
ting for a scientific theory. [33, p. 9] (emphasis in the
original)
ET’s emphasis is on the distinction between countable (see Section 4.5)
and uncountable languages. Their emphasis makes it clear that they
view a countably infinite language as a suitable setting for a scientific
theory, whereas an uncountably infinite language is “infeasible” and
“to say the least . . . unusual” to such an end.
Since ET don’t reveal the details, it may be helpful to point out that
a standard construction of a hyperreal structure over a countable index
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set, together with the language including all n-ary functions on N and
all 1-place predicates on N, already gives a rigid model of ∗R.3 Such a
structure has cardinality c.
Such a setting is not an unusual setting for a scientific theory and
on the contrary is the standard setting routinely used in physics; see
e.g., Section 4.5.
5. New developments in physics
After making some preliminary remarks concerning the continuum
hypothesis, ET proceed to claim the following:
There is a slim road here through which new information
could change our view: new physical discoveries could
demonstrate the falseness of the continuum hypothesis
and find some way to uniquely distinguish a particular,
rigid, hyperreal structure which has an observable phys-
ical significance. Because of this possibility, we cannot
claim that the hyperreals couldn’t possibly be applica-
ble; we can only claim an applicable use of the hyperreals
would require substantial new developments in physics.
[33] (emphasis in the original)
ET’s claim that “an applicable use of the hyperreals would require sub-
stantial new developments in physics” is a non-sequitur even by their
own criterion of rigidity, since reasonable rigid hyperreal systems exist
regardless of the status of the continuum hypothesis; see Section 4.6.
5.1. Sources on applications of Robinson’s framework. The mo-
nograph by Albeverio et al. ([1], 1986) contains five hundred pages of
meaningful applications of the hyperreals in physics, rebutting the ET
thesis. ET mention the work [1] briefly as an “actual proposal . . . for
the use of the hyperreals in science (as in, for instance, [Albeverio et
al., 1986])” in [34], but provide no substantive evaluation of its merits.
Many applications to physics, probability theory, stochastic analysis,
mathematical economics, and theoretical ecology appear in the books
• Robinson ([70], 1966, chapter IX),
• Nelson ([65], 1987),
• Capin´ski–Cutland ([19], 1995),
• Arkeryd et al. ([2], 1997),
• Faris ([37], 2006),
3More precisely, due to the availability of a first-order definable pairing function
in (N,+, ·) (Cantor’s pairing function), all n-ary functions on N can be first-order
simulated once we have all 1-place predicates.
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• Van den Berg and Neves ([76], 2007),
• Loeb and Wolff ([60], 2015),
• Lobry ([61], 2018),
and in many other sources.
5.2. Why elementary equivalence? ET acknowledge the possibil-
ity “that some physical quantity has non-Archimedean behavior” [33,
p. 10] but question the need for elementary equivalence with R. Such a
need could be argued as follows. If science tells us that some quantity
grows exponentially, we would want “exponential” to have the usual
meaning in the whole non-Archimedean domain. In other words, we
would want the domain to be elementarily equivalent to R with respect
to the properties of the exponential.
Furthermore, we want elementary equivalence for elegance and there
is no need necessarily to have reasons from physics (even though such
reasons are available). This is in line with the ET admission of full R,
rather than using just some countable subfield of it, for reasons of
elegance; see Section 4.1.
5.3. Quantifier structure. ET write:
[W]hile the hyperreals are meaningful objects worthy of
their own study, there are other contexts (particularly
dealing with real analysis, and the physical theories us-
ing it) where they are mere tools for avoiding some com-
plexity in dealing with quantifier structure. [33, p. 12]
In mathematical pedagogy particularly at freshman level, one of the
main advantages of the hyperreals is providing a simplification of such
“quantifier structure” (see e.g., [54]). However, ET’s reference to phys-
ical theories makes it clear that they are not limiting their sweeping
“mere tool” claim echoing Connes (see [50]) to pedagogy. As such,
their claim has little basis.
5.4. Connes and first mathematical principles. ET proceed to
relate to the rebuttal as developed in [50] of Connes’ critique, which
involves two separate points:
(1) the issue of undefinability, where Connes claims to be thor-
oughly familiar with the “Polish school of logic” through a sem-
inar he participated in, and drops hints related to Solovay mod-
els that indicate that he is talking about a purely mathematical
issue that he claims to be a shortcoming of the hyperreals.
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(2) the issue of “constructiveness” which (unlike Bishop) he inter-
prets as applicability to physics. Sanders has analyzed the dif-
ference between Bishop’s and Connes’ take on “constructive-
ness” in [72].
ET treat the issue as follows. They mention Connes’ critique and the
rebuttal that appeared in [50], and then point out that “the real issue”
is not the abstruse one of the details of the mathematical definitions,
but rather an alleged inapplicability in physics:
One major line of debate focuses on the claim that no
non-standard hyperreal can be ‘named’. Connes tries
to establish this claim by arguing that a given non-
standard integer in a hyperreal field can be used to gen-
erate a non-principal ultrafilter over the natural num-
bers, or a non-measurable set of reals. Since these com-
plex entities seem to be beyond some limit of complexity
for physical beings like us to grasp, this is said to raise
problems for any appeal to hyperreals. Kanovei, Katz,
and Morman dispute Connes’ claims about the associa-
tion of a non-principal ultrafilter with a given hyperreal
field . . . We claim that definability is not the real issue
here. These things are ‘definable’ in the strict mathe-
matical sense, but the ‘definitions’ don’t serve the pur-
pose we need definitions to serve in physical models, of
making it possible to uniquely measure quantities. [33,
p. 12] (emphasis added)
In this passage, ET are equivocating on the meaning of Connes’ criti-
cism and more precisely conflating two separate issues. Namely, as ar-
gued in [50], Connes places himself on the purely mathematical plane
(the chimera track of Section 2.1) when he voices his undefinability
critique. The article [50] argues that his critique is incoherent. ET
misrepresent the picture by changing the subject to physical applica-
tions (the dart track of Section 2.1). Now the dart objection is also
an objection Connes formulated, but it is a different one, and the re-
sponse to that in [50] was different, as well. Thus the ET criticism
of the rebuttal of Connes in [50] involves the fallacy of moving the
goalposts.
Connes claims that he can establish from first mathematical princi-
ples, having to do with Solovay’s model, that something is amiss with
Robinson’s infinitesimals (and therefore shift the focus to Connes’ own
noncommutative infinitesimals; see also the analysis given in [53] of
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Connes’ critique). That is the myth debunked in [50]. This partic-
ular theoretical issue has nothing directly to do with applications to
physics (though Connes seeks to apply his contention so as to claim
that allegedly no such applications are possible).
The ET approach suffers from the same shortcoming as Connes’,
in that they ignore the concrete applications of Robinson’s framework
as for instance in [1] (see Section 5.1 for other sources), and instead
attempt to argue from first mathematical principles that Robinson’s
framework is not applicable to physics. Their attempt misses the target
as did the earlier salvos of both Connes [25] and Easwaran [31].
5.5. Applications, σ-additivity of Lebesgue measure. The ET
text contains the following remarkable passage:
Note that our worry in application is about existence
proofs, and not all uses of the Axiom of Choice. [Bascelli
et al., 2014] point out (pp. 851-2) that the countable
additivity of Lebesgue measure requires the Axiom of
Choice to prove. It is consistent with ZF that the set
of all real numbers be a countable union of countable
sets. Rejection of the Axiom of Choice would surely
cause problems for those who want to say that Lebesgue
measure is countably additive. [34, p. 13]
Having stated the dilemma, ET attempt to resolve it:
But we don’t reject the Axiom of Choice - we reject
the realist applicability of mathematical entities whose
existence is independent of ZF. Thus, even if someone
were to convince us to accept some alternate mathemat-
ics on which there is a countable collection of countable
sets whose union is all of R, we would say that in prac-
tice it is safe to assume countable additivity of Lebesgue
measure, because these counterexamples would have no
applicability in practice. (ibid.)
Here ET allude to models of set theory where R is a countable union
of countable sets, e.g., the Feferman–Levy model (FL). The pertinence
of the ET claim that such models “have no applicability in practice”
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needs to be understood.4 In the passage quoted above, ET attempt to
change the subject from
(1) the applicability of σ-additivity of Lebesgue measure, to
(2) the properties of the Feferman–Levy model.
Their strategy is based on the fallacy of moving the goalposts. What
is important in applications is not the somewhat paradoxical decompo-
sition properties of item (2) (see [49] for an interesting consequence),
but rather the convenient tool of σ-additivity of Lebesgue measure as
in item (1). It may be interesting to note that Lebesgue himself re-
quired his measure to be countably additive; see [59, p. 236] and [46,
p. 122]. In fact, the endorsement of σ-additivity in (Easwaran [30],
2013) creates an awkward situation where the author wants to eat the
cake (“reject the realist applicability of”AC) and have it, too (namely,
assume σ-additivity of the Lebesgue measure).
ET claim to “point out serious problems for the use of the hyperreals
(and other entities whose existence is proven only using the Axiom of
Choice) in describing the physical world in a real way.” They also
remark:
[O]ther entities dependent on the Axiom of Choice don’t
lend themselves so naturally to physical theorizing, but
we think the points we make apply generally. [34, page 1]
Meanwhile, the σ-additive Lebesgue measure is another entity depen-
dent on AC that is widely used in physical theorizing (see Section 5.8).
Thus the ET denial of applicability to hyperreals would apply equally
well to the σ-additive Lebesgue measure, contrary to much evidence
that points in the opposite direction, namely to the usefulness of the σ-
additive Lebesgue measure in scientific applications, rebutting the ET
thesis.
In sum, the real issue is not, as ET imply, whether the decompo-
sitions as in (2) have “applicability in practice”, but rather whether
σ-additivity mentioned in (1) has applicability in practice.
4The FL model of R admits a decomposition
R =
⋃
n∈N
Cn where each Cn is countable. (5.1)
Note that FL cannot support a countably additive Lebesgue measure (because
countable sets are Lebesgue measurable and their measure is 0, while countable
additivity and decomposition (5.1) would then entail that every subset of R is a
null set). One can still define a Lebesgue measure in FL, but it will only be finitely
additive (see Section 5.7). Thus it is consistent with ZF that the Lebesgue measure
is not σ-additive.
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Recall that one of the applications of the Lebesgue measure is the
definition of the spaces Lp and of the Sobolev spaces W k,p; we recall
that if 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ these are Banach spaces, and if p = 2 the spaces L2
and the space W k,2 = Hk are Hilbert spaces.
Sobolev spaces are widely used for the study of Partial Differential
Equations, that in turn are applied to the mathematical description of
physical phenomena. The essential point here is that these applications
depend upon properties of the Sobolev spaces that are independent of
ZF, and typically require AC for their proof; see Sections 5.7 and 5.8
for more details.
Faced with the ubiquitous reliance on the axiom of countable choice
(ACC) in the foundations of analysis and topology, many mathemati-
cians opt to incorporate ACC (or the stronger axiom of countable de-
pendent choice) as part of the basic foundational package, and adopt
ZF+ACC as their philosophical credo. However, this option is not
available to ET since they ground their real applicability thesis (on
behalf of mathematics based on ZF) in the allegedly constructive na-
ture of ZF foundations (a claim that would be even less plausible for
ZF+ACC than for ZF). ET’s constructive track is analyzed in Sec-
tion 5.8.
5.6. Connes & Katz versus ET. ET seek to oppose Connes and
Katz on the issue of scientific applications:
In recent years, there has been much debate about the
value of the hyperreals, with two main views exemplified
by Alain Connes and Mikhail Katz, and various coau-
thors of each. [33, p. 11]
However, the salient point here is that Connes and Katz are on the same
side as against ET’s denial of applicability of AC and/or related prin-
ciples. Thus, Connes routinely exploits AC in developing the objects
he needs to work with his (Connes’) infinitesimals, such as the Dixmier
trace (which is a Connesian version of integration of noncommuting
infinitesimals), and exploits the Cˇech–Stone compactification βN of N
in [24, ch. V, sect. 6.δ, Def. 11]; for details see [50].
5.7. Measures without AC. Few authors have focused on the study
of the properties of Sobolev spaces in ZF without AC, i.e., in a setting
where the Lebesgue measure is only finitely additive.
Terry Tao in [75, Definition 1.2.2] uses a definition of Lebesgue mea-
sure that works in ZF. When extended to ZFC this definition gives
the standard σ-additive Lebesgue measure. Therefore Tao’s definition
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is preferable to definitions that have σ-additivity built into the defini-
tion and therefore don’t make sense over ZF. In view of the above, the
measure as defined by Tao is not merely a Lebesgue-like measure but
arguably the Lebesgue measure itself.
We note that the measure theory textbook by Paul Halmos mentions
AC only in the context of the construction of a nonmeasurable set.
Halmos’ proof of σ-additivity makes no mention of AC, and is therefore
inaccurate. The gap is in [45, p. 42, line -3], where ACC is relied upon
implicitly. Further gaps in Halmos (mainly of a philosophical type) are
analyzed in [11].
The book [9] contains a thorough study of the properties of finitely
additive measures and of the corresponding Lp spaces. The main draw-
backs of using finitely additive measures instead of the Lebesgue mea-
sure are that
(1) the Lp spaces are not complete with respect to convergence in
measure;
(2) their completions, the so-called V p spaces, are Banach spaces;
however, it is not mentioned whether V 2 is a Hilbert space.
If V 2 is not a Hilbert space, then many results on Hk spaces relying
on the inner product given by the Lebesgue integral might not hold for
finitely additive measures. As a consequence, the study of relatively
simple problems, such as the weak formulation of the Laplace equa-
tion, might not be practical, since the existence of a weak solution to
its Dirichlet problem relies on the Riesz Representation Theorem for
the Sobolev space H1
0
and on the weak sequential compactness of this
space. We recall that the Laplace equation is used as a model of var-
ious physical phenomena, since its solution can be interpreted as the
density of a physical quantity in a state of equilibrium. Some physical
laws, such as Fourier’s law of heat conduction or Ohm’s law of electrical
conduction, can be formulated by means of the Laplace equation; see
Evans [36] for further details.
We remark that, by working with the algebra of Borel-coded sub-
sets B of a topological space X instead of the whole algebra of Borel
subsets, it is possible to refine some finitely additive measures defined
over X to Borel-coded measures, that are σ-additive over a suitable
σ-algebra E ⊆ B. The details of the construction are discussed by
Fremlin [40, Chapter 56]; we refer also to the appendix of Foreman–
Wehrung [39] for a gentle introduction and further references. If the
underlying topological space X is second countable, the spaces Lp(X),
whose elements are (equivalence classes) of Borel-coded functions whose
p-th power is integrable with respect to a codably σ-finite Borel-coded
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measure, are norm-complete whenever 1 ≤ p < ∞; under the same
hypotheses L2 is also Hilbert space [40, Chapter 56, pp. 204, 212].
Note that this construction applies to the finitely-additive Lebesgue
measure over R. Since second countability of R can be proved in
ZF alone (see Herrlich [48]), even in the Feferman–Levy model of the
real line there is a (Borel-coded) Lebesgue measure which is σ-additive
on a nontrivial σ-algebra of subsets of R and whose Lp spaces are com-
plete. However, to the best of our knowledge, these spaces of Borel-
coded Lebesgue measurable functions have not yet been successfully
applied in the sense advocated by ET. See Section 5.8 for further lim-
itations on the applications of the Lp spaces without AC.
5.8. ET’s worry and the Dirichlet problem. In the passage quoted
in Section 5.5, ET express a “worry” concerning existence proofs that
make use of AC. They advocate the use of “constructive or computable
approximations” [34, p. 13] of some results depending on it, such as
the Hahn–Banach theorem. Their position echoes the more radical
rejection of indirect proofs by constructive mathematicians following
Bishop and Bridges [10], [15].
We recall that the approach of Bishop and his school is claimed
to be consistent with classical mathematics without AC, since at its
core it consists in the rejection of the law of excluded middle and of
those principles of classical mathematics that imply it, such as AC or
the Hahn–Banach theorem. Existence results obtained without these
principles can and have been turned into algorithms; however, their
scope does not yet include some central areas of mathematics such as
the theory of partial differential equations.
Consider for instance the constructive Laplace equation, discussed by
Bridges and McKubre-Jordens in [16]. The authors admit that it is not
always possible to define constructively a solution (since the Riesz Rep-
resentation Theorem is not constructively valid for every function inH1
0
and since weak sequential compactness does not entail constructively
the existence of a limit). Thus, they write: “We prove the (perhaps sur-
prising) result that the existence of solutions in the general case is an
essentially nonconstructive proposition: there is no algorithm which
will actually compute solutions for arbitrary domains and boundary
conditions” [16, p. 1]. In a similar vein, Bridges and McKubre-Jordens
write:
In this section we prove that the existence of a weak so-
lution of the general Dirichlet problem [for the Laplace
equation] for a domain Ω ⊂ R2 cannot be proved con-
structively. [16, p. 6]
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In fact their article may have been more accurately titled “Failing to
solve the Dirichlet problem constructively.”
As a consequence, this relatively simple equation is not yet tractable
by means of their approach. Meanwhile, the non-constructive proof
techniques that are used in classical mathematics to prove the exis-
tence and uniqueness of a solution to the Laplace equation are applied
systematically to other PDEs arising in physics and in engineering (see
Pinchover–Rubinstein [66]). To the best of our knowledge, no appli-
cable alternative to the use of AC in the theory of PDEs has been
proposed yet.
5.9. Applications of finitely additive measures. Some mathemati-
cians have argued against the exclusive use of σ-additive measures. For
instance, de Finetti suggested that fair lotteries over infinite sets should
be modelled by finitely additive measures [27]. With different motiva-
tions, Nelson proposed an approach to probability theory based solely
on hyperfinitely additive measures in the context of Internal Set The-
ory [65]; see also the more recent axiomatic approaches by Benci et
al. [7], [8].
The advantages of relinquishing σ-additivity are not limited to prob-
ability theory: a well-known result in Robinson’s framework entails
that any measure, be it σ-additive or simply finitely additive, can be
represented by a hyperfinite counting measure (see Henson [47]); in ad-
dition, it is possible to require many degrees of compatibility between
the standard measure and its hyperfinite representative [6], or even
construct a single hyperfinite counting measure that is simultaneously
compatible with all of the Hausdorff measures [77].
Hyperfinite counting measures enable one to define functional spaces
that are expressive enough to represent not only the Sobolev spaces
W k,p, but also other generalized functions commonly used for the study
of PDEs. For instance, in [14] it is shown that all linear PDEs and many
nonlinear ones can be given an equivalent nonstandard formulation in
the space of grid functions of nonstandard analysis, thus providing a
unifying framework for the study of problems that in standard math-
ematics require different approaches. For a more precise statement on
the advantages of grid functions in the theory of PDEs, we refer to [14],
[13], and [12].
5.10. Effective concepts. Brunner et al. open their article with the
following illuminating passage:
A concept is effective in the sense of Sierpin´ski if it does
not require the axiom of choice AC. Here we show by
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means of examples that fundamental notions of quan-
tum theory are not effective. For instance (see Sec-
tion 1.2) there is an irreflexive Hilbert space L, con-
structed from Russell’s socks in the second Fraenkel
model M2. Hence the very notion of a self-adjoint op-
erator as an observable of quantum theory may become
meaningless without the axiom of choice. (Brunner et
al. [17, p. 319])
The authors go on to hedge their bets with the following: “Never-
theless we identify a nontrivial class of observables, the intrinsically
effective Hamiltonians, which is compatible with L in the following
sense, etc.” (ibid.). We should note that a typical physicist is not very
interested in limiting the scope of applicability of mathematical results
by introducing foundational restrictions (such as banning AC), nor in
introducing technical complications necessitated by such restrictions.
On the contrary, he seeks constantly to “push the envelope” by apply-
ing mathematical methods somewhat beyond their ‘official’ domain of
applicability. Well-known examples of such attitudes are Dirac’s delta
‘function’ and the Feynman ‘integral.’
6. Conclusion
Easwaran and Towsner argue that the hyperreal number system of
Robinson’s infinitesimal analysis is a good instrumental theory, i.e., a
theory that is “useful for proving theorems about the real numbers,”
but at the same time it is not suitable for the description of physical
phenomena, since the infinitesimals of Robinson’s framework are “ide-
alisations that don’t correspond to the world.” However, these claims
rest upon an outdated conception of mathematical realism and on the
identification of the physical continuum with the Cantor–Dedekind con-
tinuum of real numbers as understood by these classical authors. By
abandoning the idea that the relation between mathematics and physi-
cal reality must be that of an isomorphism, one sees that the arguments
proposed by ET against the applicability of the hyperreals, such as the
distinction between instrumental and applicable theories, are inade-
quate.
While ET concede that new developments in physics could lead to
a different model of the physical continuum, they seem to ignore the
fact that this approach has already been proposed by many authors. In
fact, there are many applications of Robinson’s framework to physics,
economics and other sciences, that are unfortunately not discussed in
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any detail by ET, who choose instead to argue that the hyperreals are
inapplicable from first principles and with ad-hoc arguments.
In an attempt to show that their critique is not meant to single out
Robinson’s framework, ET suggest that the flaws attributed to the hy-
perreal numbers are shared also by other mathematical entities whose
existence cannot be proved in ZF, being dependent on the axiom of
choice (AC). Yet, they quickly conclude that “other entities dependent
on the Axiom of Choice don’t lend themselves so naturally to physical
theorizing” and “they won’t generally play any role in application,”
thus focusing their attack on Robinson’s infinitesimals. However, their
stance on the applicability of mathematical entities dependent upon
AC is inconsistent, since E argued in an earlier publication in favor
of σ-additivity, a property independent of ZF. Moreover, ET do not
address the fact that many other applicable mathematical theories re-
quire some form of a choice principle. As an example, in Section 5 we
showed that even simple PDEs become intractable without σ-additivity
of the Lebesgue measure.
Thus, if mathematical entities dependent upon AC should cause
worry and ultimately are deemed not truly applicable, then accord-
ing to ET many areas of mathematics, such as the theory of PDEs
or the formalism of quantum mechanics, would suffer from the same
drawbacks attributed to the hyperreals. Being that these theories are
widely applied also outside of mathematics, the ET position is hardly
defensible.
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